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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Michael

S.

Dauber appeals pro

se

from

his

judgment of conviction

for second-

degree murder in case CR-14-312, and from his judgment 0f conviction for seconddegree murder in case CR-14-2027. Dauber claims the
those cases,

now

withdraw his guilty plea

Of The

Facts

in case

district court’s

I,

Dauber

pp.33-352.) Dauber

a death to law enforcement and for use of a deadly

(R. V01.

for

1

I,

trial.

its

discretion.

Proceedings

a grand jury indicted

Steven Kalogerakos. (R. V01.

order denying his motion to

CR-14-3 12, claiming the court abused

And Course Of The

March of 2014,

In

guilty pleas he entered in

consolidated on appeal, were coerced.

Dauber additionally appeals from the

Statement

m1

was

for the ﬁrst-degree

murder of

also indicted for failure t0 report

weapon

in the

commission of a crime.

pp.33-35.) Dauber entered a not-guilty plea and the case, CR-14-312,

(R. V01.

North Carolina

I,

V.

was

set

p.64.)

Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

2

The state Will use the following citations in this brief: “R. V01. I” refers to the 354-page
volume that contains the clerk’s record in CR-14-312. “R. V01. II” refers to the 213-page
volume that contains exhibits and other pleadings relating t0 CR-14-312. “R. V01. III”
refers t0 the 368-page volume that contains the clerk’s record in CR-14-2027. “R. V01.
IV” refers to the 405-page volume that contains exhibits and other pleadings relating to
CR-14-2027.
that

was held

“2/20/15 Tr.” refers t0 the 76-page transcript of the preliminary hearing
in

CR-14-2027. “6/14/14 Tr.”

refers to the sentencing hearing, both

“PSI

V01.

IV”

of which can be found in

volume 0f the presentence investigation.
and “10/27/16 Tr.” respectively refer t0 the two hearings on
withdraw his plea, both of which are found in the 40-page transcript.

refers t0 the 107-page fourth

Finally, “10/25/16 Tr.”

Dauber’s motion to

and “10/28/16 Tr.”
the 72-page transcript.

refers the plea hearing

Thereafter, in

December 0f 2014,

the state ﬁled an information charging

with the ﬁrst—degree murder of Joshua Reddington.
also charged

III,

Dauber With use of a deadly weapon

pp.98-100.) In this

death penalty.

new

(R. V01.

case,

III,

in the

CR-14-2027, the

state

III,

pp.98-100.)

The

commission of a crime.

state

(R. V01.

ﬁled a notice of intent to seek the

Following a preliminary hearing (R. V01.

pp.49-52.)

pp.105-22) Dauber was bound over to

(R. V01.

Dauber

district court (R. V01. III,

pleaded not guilty and the case was set for

tria.

(R. V01.

III,

pp.94-97, 123).

III,

He

p. 145.)

In January 0f 2016, the district court referred the cases to another district court

judge “for criminal mediation pursuant to [Idaho] Criminal Rule 18.1.”
That mediation, which was attended by the

p.22, Ls.19-22.)

from both

cases,

state,

(10/27/16 T11,

Dauber, his attorneys

and the mediating judge, took place “0n June 2nd and June 3rd.”

(10/27/16 T12, p.22, L25.)

The mediation was
that while the parties

had mediated

in

good

successful mediation; however, [Judge Ryan]

open mind and perhaps be open
6.)

And

that

“Judge Ryan advised [the

initially unsuccessful.

faith,

they were unable t0 conclude a

was hopeﬁJI

that the parties

t0 reopening the mediation.”

was what eventually occurred;

district court]

would keep an

(10/27/16 Tr., p.23, Ls.2-

the mediation “reengaged” and

was

ultimately “successﬁll.” (10/27/16 Tr., p.23, Ls.7-9.)

The

parties entered into a binding

things, that the state

Rule 11 plea agreement

stating,

among

other

would “ﬁle an Amended Information charging the Defendant with

one count 0f second degree murder in each case”; Dauber would enter
in both cases; both parties

would

m1

guilty pleas

“stipulate that there is factual basis for the plea

and ask

the Court to take judicial notice of the preliminary hearing and grand jury transcripts as

providing a factual plea”; and “[t]he Court and
agree t0 bind

itself,

all parties

agree,

and ask the Court

pursuant t0 [Idaho Criminal Rule] 11, t0 run the sentences 0n the two

charges concurrent, Which shall have the effect of imposing the
sentence t0 seventeen (17) years of conﬁnement
penitentiary.” (R. V01.

The

I,

it

district court

“would agree

life

possible

indeterminate in the

subsequently informed the parties in chambers “that While

to

is

not the standard or practice of this

be bound by the negotiation that had been concluded by the

parties.” (10/27/16 Tr., p.23, Ls.12-18.)

to the

ﬁxed and

maximum

pp.226-27.)

agreeing t0 a binding Rule 11 plea agreement
Court,”

t0

The

district court

accordingly signed and agreed

Rule 11 agreement, as did the mediating judge, and the

parties.

(R. V01.

I,

p.228;

10/27/16 Tr., p.23, Ls.19-22.)

That same day, Dauber ﬁlled out a guilty plea advisory form. (R. V01.
37; R. V01.

to

III,

pp.245-52.) In the section asking if “any other promises” had been

inﬂuence his decision to plead

guilty,

III,

p.249.)

made

that “st will not pursue fraud

Dauber wrote

charges associated W/ [Dauber’s eX-Wife3] receiving A’s

R. V01.

pp.229-

I,

VA.

In response t0 the questions asking “[d]o

beneﬁts.” (R. V01.

you understand

I,

that

p.233;

n0 one,

including you attorney, can force you to plead guilty in this case,” and “[a]re you entering

your plea freely and voluntarily,” Dauber circled “YES.”
p.252.)

The form

additionally stated “I have answered the questions

Guilty Plea Advisory form truthfully, understand

3

The record

(R. V01.

alternatively refers t0 the

all

I,

p.237; R. V01.

III,

0n pages 1-7 0f this

0f the questions and answers herein,

same individual

as Dauber’s “eX-wife”

and his

“Wife.” For consistency the state will simply refer to Dauber’s “eX-wife.” Additionally,

quotations from Dauber’s handwritten pleadings below, and brieﬁng 0n appeal, will be

reproduced with corrected capitalization.

my attorney,

have discussed each question and answer With
freely

V01.

and voluntarily,” and
p.252.)

III,

R. V01.

III,

that

“no one has threatened

Dauber signed and dated the

have completed

me to

d0 so.” (R.

guilty plea advisory form.

V01.

I,

this

form

p.237; R.

(R. V01.

I,

p.237;

p.252.)

Pursuant to the plea agreement, the state ﬁled an amended information in each
case, charging

Dauber with one count 0f second-degree murder

pp.222-23; R. V01.

III,

pp.257-59.)

The

district

court and

in each case.

(R. V01.

Dauber had a

1.,

lengthy,

comprehensive colloquy in which Dauber afﬁrmed, among other things, that no one
“threatened [him] or anyone close to [him]” to secure the plea.

The

10.)

made

district court

freely

accepted Dauber’s guilty pleas in both cases, Which

and voluntarily,” and

(6/14/16 Tr., p.21, L.25

On

— p.23,

set the

L.19; R. V01.

October 11, 2016, the

I,

The

district court

did not read

it

III,

I,

4

Volumes

III,

p.263.) That

found “were

p.241.)

received a letter from Dauber. (R.

p.263; 10/27/16 Tr., p.24, L.25

at that time,

“was not informed of

returned the original letter and copies t0 counsel.

p.242; R. V01.

it

matter for sentencing 0n October 28, 2016.

district court’s clerk

p.242; R. V01. H4, p.204; R. V01.

V01.

(6/14/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.8-

its

—

p.25, L.3.)

contents,” and

(10/27/16 Tr., p.25, Ls.4-19; R. V01.

same day, Dauber’s counsel met with

I,

the district court, to

and IV of the clerk’s record, as well as the transcripts of the 10/25/16 and
10/27/16 hearings on the plea withdrawal motion, were originally ﬁled under seal with

this

II

Court pursuant to the

district court’s order.

(E

10/27/16 Tr., p.39, Ls.7-23.)

Dauber, through prior appellate counsel, requested that these items be unsealed “in order
for

him

to pursue the issue

he intends to raise on appeal.”

Records and Transcripts and Statement in Support Thereof,
this

Court granted that motion.

EOn

Mot.

p.1.

to

Unseal Sealed

December

19,

2018,

advise

to

it

that “there

was some concern

withdraw his guilty plea.” (10/25/16

On

October

to

Tr., p.2, Ls.6-18.)

district court

(10/25/16 Tr., p.2, Ls. 19-21;

would not “receive motions unless

“motion” was returned to Dauber.

motion

Mr. Dauber wanted t0 ﬁle a motion for leave

2016, Dauber mailed a handwritten “motion t0 Withdraw[] guilty

13,

plea” in the CR-14-2027 case.

Because the

that

ﬂ

R. V01.

they’re ﬁled

CR-14-2027

in the

pp.205-06.)

by counsel,”

the

Consequently, n0

(10/25/16 T11, p.2, Ls.21-23.)

withdraw the plea was ever ﬁled

II,

(m R.

case.

V01.

III;

10/27/16 Tr., p.38, Ls.15-17.)

On

October

CR-14-3 12.

guilty plea in case

memorandum of
support (R. V01.

2016, Dauber’s counsel ﬁled a motion t0 Withdraw Dauber’s

17,

(R. V01.

support (R. V01.

II,

II,

II,

pp.78-80.) Dauber’s counsel thereafter ﬁled a

pp.81-85) and a supplemental

pp.126-29), which included three attachments: Exhibit A, Which

the handwritten letter previously sent t0 the court

Exhibit B, which

Which the

the “motion”

was

district court

“a copy of a

memorandum of

Dauber attempted

did not accept (R. V01.

handwritten

0n October

letter that

II,

11 (R. V01.

to ﬁle in case

II,

was

p.204);

CR-14-2027, but

pp.205-06); and Exhibit C, which was

Mr. Dauber wrote

dated August let, 2016 t0

[counsel in the CR-14-2027 case] regarding his desire to withdraw his guilty plea and the

reasons stated in the letter” (10/25/16 Tr., p.4, L.23

Dauber submitted an

initially

—

p.5, L.2; R. V01.

unsigned afﬁdavit, Which the court

II,

later

p.207). Finally,

accepted

at the

hearing in a “signed and notarized” form with handwritten interlineations. (10/25/16 Tr.,

p.5, Ls.5-10; R. V01.

generally argued,

innocent.

II,

among

(ﬂ R. V01.

II,

pp.202-03.)

Dauber’s motion and the supporting materials

other things, that his plea had been coerced and that he

pp.202-04, 205-06.)

was

The

district

on Dauber’s motion

court held a hearing

to

Withdraw

his plea.

(10/25/16 Tr.) Dauber’s counsel argued that Dauber was coerced into pleading guilty due
t0 “being

misled about the prosecution 0f [Dauber’s eX-Wife] for fraud.” (10/25/16

According

p.9, Ls.21-23.)

the

FBI

t0 counsel,

was Dauber’s “perception

would be prosecuted

said that [Dauber’s eX-wife]

not accept the [sentence 0f] 17 t0

it

life.”

at the

T11,

mediation that

for fraud if the defendant did

(10/25/16 T11, p.9, L.25

—

Counsel

p.10, L.3.)

noted that Dauber “does not feel that he was coerced by any 0f his attorneys, including
the attorneys in [case

p.10, Ls.8—10.)

number CR-14-2027],

in taking this plea bargain.”

Rather, “the coercion emanated from the misunderstanding about his eX-

Wife being prosecuted for fraud by taking military benefits.” (10/25/16

According to Dauber, “he researched

13.)

The hearing on

At

the motion to withdraw

and

intelligently

“was

not

it

it

t0 a later date.

(10/27/16

“reviewed the plea colloquy and

found “that Mr. Dauber’s pleas were entered knowingly

and voluntary”; and

coerced.”

Tr., p.1 1, Ls.2-4.)

was continued

the next hearing, the district court noted that

the guilty plea advisory”; that

Tr., p.10, Ls.1 1-

afterwards, and he determined that [the state]

it

could not prove the fraud charges against his wife.” (10/25/16

Tr.)

{10/25/16 Tr.,

{10/27/16

that

Tr.,

Dauber “knew the nature 0f the charges” and
p.29,

Ls.8-13.)

His

plea

was

therefore

“constitutionally valid.” (10/27/16 T11, p.30, Ls.1-3.)

The

district court

then considered Whether Dauber had shown a “just reason” for

withdrawing the constitutionally valid plea.
pointed out

sentence,

that,

because the

district court

(10/27/16 Tr., pp.30-37.)

The court

ﬁrst

agreed to impose the predetermined Rule 11

Dauber “knew What the sentence would be.” (10/27/16

Tr., p.31, Ls.3-9.)

As

such

was a case Where

this

the court could “temper

its

liberality

by weighing the

defendant’s apparent motive” in ﬁling the motion. (10/27/16 Tr., p.31, Ls.3-14.)

The

district

Dauber

court concluded that

failed t0

Withdrawing his plea. As for Dauber’s claims of innocence, the

was

“settled that a denial of factual guilt

plea in cases Where there

Ls.21-24.)

And

some

to.

a just reason for

district court

found that

it

not a just reason for the later Withdrawal 0f a

is

basis in the record of factual guilt.” (10/27/16 Tr., p.31,

the court concluded there

himself admitted

— p.16,

is

show

was such a

factual basis here,

Which Dauber

{10/27/16 Tr., p.32, L.2 — p.33, L.10 (citing (6/14/16 Tr., p.15, L.17

L.2).)

Turning to the alleged coercion, the

district court

concluded that the “agreement

not t0 charge” Dauber’s eX-wife “did not describe coercive circumstances” but was

“simply the normal consequences of a negotiation in a criminal process.” (10/27/16
p.34, Ls.4-7.)

The court pointed out

Tr.,

that the “discussions about charging the wife

occurred during plea negotiations” where defense counsel “would have been present,”

and Where Dauber “was
Tr., p.34,

free t0 accept 0r reject the offers”

L.19 — p.35, L.2.) The

district court

found

it

made by

the state. (10/27/16

had “every conﬁdence

plea negotiation procedures were used because they were being

managed by Judge Ryan

in a judicially authorized criminal mediation.” (10/27/16 Tr., p.36, Ls.8-1 1.)

additionally concluded that

The court

none 0f the miscellaneous justiﬁcations Dauber asserted

withdrawing his plea rose “to the level of just reason” t0 withdraw the plea.
Tr., p.36,

that proper

L.15 — p.37, L.21.)

Finally, the district court

made

the following ﬁnding:

for

{10/27/16

I’ve also considered the defendant’s motive.

And

I

conclude that

I

am

persuaded that the signiﬁcant delay between the entry 0f the guilty plea on
June 14th and the ﬁrst ﬁling 0f the motion, which could be either October
11th or October 13th, 0r the earlier letter t0 counsel 0f August 11th, that

an aspect 0f this that is simply Mr.
Dauber’s realization that the day of reckoning is coming soon, and it may
be a much more sobering thought than he had thought when he entered his
that delay suggests that there is

guilty plea.

(10/27/16 Tr., p.37, L.25

Because Dauber

— p.38,
failed t0

L.9.)

show

his plea

was

constitutionally invalid,

he failed to show a just reason t0 Withdraw the plea, the

district court

and because

accordingly denied

“the motion to withdraw the guilty plea in the 312 case.” (10/27/16 TL, p.38, Ls.10-16.)

The court

also noted that “[n]o such

motion was put forward

in the

2027 case.” {10/27/16

T11, p.38, L.17.)

Dauber was sentenced according
p.70, L.15

—

p.71, L.19.)

He

t0 the

Rule 11 plea agreement.

received concurrent

—

life

(10/28/16 TL,

sentences with 17 years

both cases.

(10/28/16 Tr., p.70, L.15

pp.268—72.)

Dauber timely appealeds from the judgments 0f conviction.

pp.264—68; R. vol.

5

p.71, L.19; R. V01.

111,

pp.284—88, 309, 31 1—17.)

The two cases have

since been consolidated

p.310.)

I,

ﬁxed

pp.248-52; R. V01.

0n appeal under n0. 44849.

in

III,

(R. V01.

(R. V01.

I,

III,

w
Dauber

states the issues

1.

Did the

district court

2.

Was

3.

Counsel was

on appeal

abuse

its

as:

discretion

by denying [Dauber’s] plea Withdrawal?

[Dauber’s] plea voluntary or coerced?

ineffective[.]

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Dauber

failed to

show

failed to

show

his

knowing,

intelligent,

and voluntary guilty plea was

coerced?

II.

Has Dauber
motion

III.

t0

Has Dauber
he has,

is

the district court abused

Withdraw his guilty plea
failed to state a claim

in case

its

discretion

by denying the

CR-14-3 12?

of ineffective assistance 0f counsel, or even

such a claim not properly before

this

Court on direct appeal?

if

ARGUMENT
I.

Dauber

Fails

T0 Show That His Knowing, Voluntary, And

Intelligent Guilty Plea

Was

CLl'ced
A.

Introduction

Dauber contends
eX-wife.

his guilty plea

According

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

“unsupported by

fact, truth

insofar as a “complete lie”

was coerced by
t0

the “false threat to prosecute” his

Dauber

this

purported threat was

and/or probable cause,” and he was deprived 0f due process

was “used

to coerce

an un-willing plea.” (Appellant’s

brief,

p.9.)

Dauber
Dauber

fails t0

show any

constitutional error.

failed to challenge the plea

below and has

plea

was knowing,

that the

for the plea in

fail

0n the

district court correctly

CR-14-2027,

fundamental error

failed to preserve a

claim 0n appeal. Alternatively, any such claim would

Turning to case CR-14-312, the

As

merits.

concluded that Dauber’s

voluntary, and intelligent. Moreover, the district court correctly found

agreement not t0 prosecute Dauber’s eX-Wife was not unconstitutional coercion.
Alternatively, even if the district court erred

standard t0 assess coercion, the remedy here

by applying the

would not be

incorrect legal

outright reversal.

Rather, this

case should be remanded t0 the district court for the limited purpose of determining

Whether the

B.

state

Standard

had probable cause

to prosecute

Dauber’s eX-Wife.

Of Review

Idaho’s appellate courts “conduct an independent review 0f the record”

appellant challenges the “voluntariness of a guilty plea
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on appeal.”

when an

State V. Spgy, 127

Idaho 107, 110, 897 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct. App. 1995) (State

794 P.2d 1150, 1151

(Ct.

V.

Ayala, 118 Idaho 94, 95,

App. 1990)). This Court will therefore “consider the

totality

of

the circumstances in determining the voluntariness 0f a plea.”

Dauber Has Failed To Preserve
Case CR-14-2027

C.

Dauber does not appear
consolidated on appeal.

(E

A

Fundamental Error Challenge T0 The Plea In

to limit his constitutional claim t0 either

80.)

The

district court

However, Dauber only successfully

Appellant’s brief.)

raised a challenge to the plea in one 0f his cases

of the two cases

below—CR-14-312.

(R. V01.

pp.78-

II,

did not accept Dauber’s handwritten “motion” to Withdraw the

plea in CR-14-2027 because the district court

ﬁled by counsel.” (10/25/16

would not “receive motions unless

Tr., p.2, Ls.21-23.)

raise a challenge to the plea in

As

such,

they’re

Dauber did not successfully

CR-14-2027 below. (See R.

V01.

III;

10/27/16 Tr., p.38,

Ls.14-17.)

Dauber would therefore
constitutionality

need

to

argue

fundamental

error

to

0f the plea in CR-14-2027 for the ﬁrst time 0n appeal.

150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010).
Appellant’s brief.)

Because appellants must

preserve issues for appeal, Patterson V. State, Dep’t of Health
321, 256 P.3d 718, 729 (201

1),

the

State V. Per_ry,

Dauber has not done

raise issues in their

attack

so.

(m

opening brieﬁng to

& Welfare,

151 Idaho 3 10,

any claim of fundamental error challenging the plea

in

CR-14-2027 has not been preserved.
Alternatively, to the extent a fundamental error challenge has

Dauber plainly
Dauber

fails to

fails to

show

meet any of Pig‘s prongs.
the

150 Idaho

at

been preserved,

228, 245 P.3d at 980.

CR-14-2027 plea entry was unconstitutional

11

for the

same

reasons he

below.

fails t0

show

the

Moreover, Dauber

fails to

evidence as to Whether 0r not

withdraw the plea
15, 2019).

in

CR-14-312 plea entry was

trial

meet

his

counsel

CR-14-2027. State

unconstitutional, as explained

burden to show that the record “contain[s]

made

a tactical decision”

V. Miller,

N0. 46517,

by never moving

slip 0p. at 3

Finally, because the district court correctly denied the

(Idaho

t0

March

motion challenging the

plea in CR-14-312 (as explained below), any failure t0 ﬁle a similar motion in CR-14-

2027 was necessarily harmless.

The Plea Agreement and Plea Colloun Show That Dauber’s Plea Was Knowing,

D.

Voluntary,

T0 pass
voluntarily.

plea

is

And Intelligent

constitutional muster a plea

State V.

must be “entered knowingly,

was voluntary

and was not coerced;

(2)

in the sense that

(3)

(1)

Whether the

he understood the nature 0f the charges

whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his

rights t0 a jury trial, t0 confront his accusers,

and

and

Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 180, 824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991). “Whether a

voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas:

defendant’s plea

intelligently

and

to refrain

m

from incriminating himself;

Whether the defendant understood the consequences 0f pleading guilty.”

Umphenour, 160 Idaho 503, 507, 376 P.3d 707, 711 (2016) (quoting

State V. Colyer, 98

Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976)).
After reviewing the guilty plea agreement and plea colloquy the district court

concluded that “Mr. Dauber’s pleas were entered knowingly and intelligently and
voluntarily.”

(10/27/17 Tr., p.29, Ls.8—10.)

portions of the plea agreement asking “[d]0

This was undoubtedly correct.

you understand

12

that

In the

n0 one, including your

attorney, can force

freely

you

t0 plead guilty in this case,”

and voluntarily,” Dauber circled “YES.” (R.
Furthermore, the

trial

V01.

and “[a]re you entering your plea

I,

p.237; R. V01.

III,

p.252.)

court undertook an exacting and comprehensive plea

(m

colloquy t0 assess Dauber’s state of mind and knowledge of the proceedings.
6/14/16 Tr., p.5, L.12 — p.23, L.1.)

The colloquy shows

understood the proceedings that were taking place,

intelligently,

and voluntarily pleading

guilty.

(m 6/14/16

Dauber readily afﬁrmed he had “sufﬁcient time
discuss

it

With his attorneys. (6/14/16

And

he afﬁrmed that he had a

that

lucid,

he was knowingly,

Tr., p.5, L.

12

— p.23,

L.1.)

to think” about his plea

Tr., p.18, Ls.6-11.)

“satisﬁed that pleading guilty under the circumstances”

Tr., p.19, Ls.1-4.)

and

Dauber was

that

was

He afﬁrmed

that

and

he was

in his “best interest” (6/ 14/ 16

“full opportunity” to

review the

transcripts

of the grand jury proceeding and the preliminary hearing testimony that

formed the

factual bases for his plea.

that,

(6/14/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.2-10.) Dauber also afﬁrmed

from his “review of the evidence, speciﬁcally with respect”

was “satisﬁed

of that character was presented to a jury in

that if evidence

jury found that evidence

was

for the jury to conclude

unanimously

both cases. (6/14/16

The

credible, there

T11, p.15,

district court

to those transcripts,

would be a sufﬁcient

that [he

this case

and the

basis in that evidence

was] guilty 0f second degree murder” in

L.17 — p.16, L.2.)

even spent additional time 0n the issue 0f potential coercion:

Has anyone threatened you or anyone close to you t0 get you to
Q:
plead guilty in this case?
A:

N0, your honor.

Q:

Did you seem

to hesitate about that?

13

he

A:

No, your honor.

(6/14/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.8-12.)

Based on the
had an ample
and

agreement and plea colloquy the

entirety of the plea

factual basis to conclude that “Mr. Dauber’s pleas

intelligently

and voluntarily.”

were entered knowingly

Dauber accordingly

(10/27/16 Tr., p.29, Ls.8-10.)

CR-14-3 12 was unconstitutional, and

fails t0

show

E.

The Agreement Not T0 Charge Dauber’s EX-Wife Was Not Coercive

that his plea in

Dauber’s only constitutional claim 0n appeal

clear that “[a] plea 0f guilty is

by ignorance,
(Ct.

fear 0r fraud.”

fails to

that his plea

(E Appellant’s

agreement not to prosecute his eX-wife.

makes

is

it is

show

error.

was coerced by

brief, pp.8-9.)

deemed coerced only Where

district court

Idaho precedent

improperly induced

State V. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 537, 211 P.3d 775,

App. 2008) (emphasis added)

(citing

gm,

App. 1995)). Where plea negotiations include

127 Idaho

state

at 110,

897 P.2d

at

1005

Li

538, 211 P.3d at 783 (citing

at

1253, 1259-60 (Ct. App. 1993)).

declines to prosecute a family

at

The

V. State,

The prosecutor

member

would have been supported by probable
124 Idaho

Mata

782
(Ct.

promises about not prosecuting loved

ones, such negotiations are not coercive in a constitutional sense if the state acts in

faith.

the

good

124 Idaho 588, 594-95, 861 P.2d

acts in

good

faith

when

the state

as part 0f a plea negotiation if that prosecution

cause. Li, at 538 n.8, 211 P.3d at 783 n.8;

m,

595, 861 P.2d at 1260.

district court

concluded the agreement not to prosecute Dauber’s eX-Wife was

not an improper threat in large part due to the unusually reliable circumstances in which
the agreement

came

together.

(10/27/16 Tr., p.34, L.19

14

— p.36,

L.1

1.)

This was a correct

application of Idaho precedent,

Which holds

that a “prosecutor’s negotiations With the

defendant are not per se coercive and will not constitute grounds for challenging the
validity of a guilty plea

Idaho

897 P.2d

at 111,

where proper plea negotiation procedures are used.”
1006

at

(citing State V. Fortin,

ﬂ, 127

124 Idaho 323, 859 P.2d 359

(Ct.

App. 1993)).

And

here the “plea negotiation procedures” could not have been

Dauber himself explained

it,

the state’s offer

more

proper.

was conveyed by a presiding judge6

As

in the

midst of a criminal mediation:

When

Judge Ryan came back in, he told
my wife would be prosecuted for fraud.
I

had n0 means

ﬁnd

did g0

t0

ﬁnd

out if that

was

me

that if

true or not.

out that she didn’t—because

I

did not take the deal,

And

afterwards

had her g0 down

I

When

to the

I

Vet

center and ask, that she didn’t do anything that constitutes fraud.

(10/25/16 Tr., p.18, Ls.19-25.)

One takeaway from Dauber’s own
was

if the

recollection, as the district court pointed out,

mediating judge was relaying the state’s

counsel present.

(E

offer,

10/27/16 Tr., p.34, Ls.19-22.)

then Dauber would have had

And

the offer

would have been

presented in a procedurally proper way, insofar as the court found

conﬁdence

that proper plea negotiation procedures

managed by Judge Ryan

6

Dauber and

did so.

times

it

in a judicially authorized criminal mediation

was implied

(Compare 10/25/16

regardless of

who

ﬂ

who

under our rules.”

conveyed the
judge all
p.18, Ls.20-21.) But

actually

that the FBI, the state, and/or the mediating

Tr., p.10,

Ls.1-2

p.11, L.12

ﬁnding of where the offer

proper conﬁnes 0f mediation.

15

ﬂi

Dauber has never shown that the
was conveyed—in the reliable and

ultimately relayed the state’s offer,

district court erred in its

had “every

were used because they were being

his attorneys presented differing accounts of

state’s offer; at

it

(10/27/16 Tr., p.36, Ls.8-1

Finally, the district court

1.)

coercive pressures were additionally diminished

mediation

any juncture.

at

What happened

by

concluded any potentially

the fact that

(10/27/16 Tr., p.34, L.23

—

Dauber could

p.35, L.2.)

And

exit the

this is exactly

one point; as Dauber himself admitted in his afﬁdavit, the ﬁrst

at

mediation session ended because he “ended the proceedings and stated [he] preferred to

go to

trial.”

(R. V01.

Thus, the

II,

p.203.)

district court correctly

perceived that the offer not to prosecute Dauber’s

eX-wife was not a “coercive circumstance[] but simply the normal consequences of a
negotiation in a criminal process.”

more

reliable

here—insofar as

it

(10/27/16 Tr., p.34, Ls.4-7.)

was mediated by a

That process was even

district court

judge, With Dauber’s

counsel present, with Dauber retaining (and in fact exercising) his ability to walk
(10/27/16 T11, p.34, L.19

any time.

—

p.36, L.11.)

The

away

at

district court thus correctly

concluded that the “record does establish that [Dauber] was not coerced.” (10/27/16 TL,
p.29, Ls.8-19.)

fails t0

show otherwise on

appeal.

Even If The District Court Applied The Incorrect Legal Standard In
Assessing Whether There Was Coercion, The Proper Relief Would Be A Limited
Remand To Determine Probable Cause
Alternatively,

F.

The
Ls.8-19.)

law

Dauber

district court correctly

But the

state

in its discussion

concluded there was n0 coercion. (10/27/16 TL, p.29,

acknowledges

that,

while the

district court cited the correct

of the agreement not to prosecute Dauber’s eX-Wife,

it

did not

case

make

a speciﬁc factual ﬁnding that the state had probable cause for prosecuting Dauber’s ex-

wife.

(E 10/27/16

Tr.,

pp.35-36

(citing,

among

16

other things, Mata, 124 Idaho 588, 861

P.2d 1253).)

On

appeal,

charge his eX-wife.

The

Dauber argues

(E Appellant’s

submits that

state

have probable cause

t0

brief, p.9.)

if this

correct legal standard the proper

that the state did not

Court concludes the

district court

remedy would not be an

Rather, the

outright reversal.

Court determines the

state respectfully suggests that if this

did not apply the

district court erred, this

case

should be remanded for the limited purpose of determining Whether the state had
probable cause (0r some other objective good-faith basis) for prosecuting Dauber’s exwife.

E

861 P.2d

Hanslovan, 147 Idaho

at

538

n.8,

211 P.3d

783

at

n.8;

m, 124

Idaho

at

595,

at 1260.

Dauber’s

United States

At

V.

own

brieﬁng alludes that

this

would be

Wright, where the Court 0f Appeals for the 10th Circuit found

that the prosecution never

had the

this record, there is

n0 evidencefrom which

had acted
t0

indict. If the

prosecution actually

made

in

good

conclude that the

prosecution had probable cause t0 indict those persons
threatened t0

that:

requisite probable cause. In response,

the government merely averred that the prosecution

0n

cites t0

showing

the evidentiary hearing, appellant offered evidence plausibly

faith.

He

the proper outcome.

it

allegedly

the alleged threats,

the threats caused appellant to plead guilty, and the threats

were not

supported by probable cause, the prosecution violated appellant’s right to

due process.

We

therefore

remand

to the district court for these factual

ﬁndings.

43 F.3d 491, 499-500 (10th

Cir.

1994) (emphasis added).

Unlike the appellant in W_rigm, Dauber has never adduced any “evidence
plausibly showing that the prosecution never had the requisite probable cause.”

Appellant’s brief;

ﬂ

R. V01.

II,

pp.202-O7.)

hearsay, purportedly relayed from

VA

Instead,

employees

17

(E

he appears to rely only on double

t0 his eX-wife t0 himself,

and his own

armchair legal conclusions that a case against his eX-Wife “could not be successful.”

(E, gg, R. V01.

II,

pp.202-03; 10/25/16

Tr., p.18, Ls.22-25.)

In any event, should this Court conclude a probable cause determination

made, then the

state respectfully requests this case

be remanded t0 the

must be

district court for

the limited purpose of making such a ﬁnding.

II.

Dauber

A.

Fails

T0 Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV Denying The Motion
T0 Withdraw His Guilty Plea In Case CR-14-3 12

Introduction

Dauber
his

motion

rely

on

to

on appeal

alleges

Withdraw his guilty

his claim that

plea.

fails to

error.

show a

L.16.) This conclusion

was

He

by denying

appears t0 again

district court’s

ﬁnding

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)

show any abuse 0f

“just reason” for

discretion

its

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)

discretion.

Dauber’s plea was constitutionally sound, the
failed to

abused

he was coerced, and additionally claims the

about his motivation was in

Dauber

that the district court

After correctly concluding that

district court

went on

withdrawing his plea. (10/27/16

to

ﬁnd

that

Tr., p.30, L.1

Dauber

—

p.38,

correct.

Moreover, Dauber only ﬁled a motion to Withdraw his plea in one of the
consolidated cases on appeal—CR-14-312.

ﬁled in case CR-14-2027.

Dauber can show the
withdraw the plea
entered in

in

(E R. V01.

district

III;

(R. V01.

II,

pp.78-80.)

N0

such motion was

10/27/16 Tr., p.38, Ls.14-17.) Thus, even if

court abused

its

discretion

by denying

CR-14-312, any such error would have n0

CR- 1 4-2027.
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effect

the motion to

on the plea he

Standard

B.

Of Review

The granting or

denial of a motion t0 withdraw a guilty plea

is

within the

Just

Reason T0

t0 sentencing.

LC. 33(0).

discretion of the trial court. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780.

The Court Correctly Determined That Dauber Did Not Show
Withdraw His Plea In Case CR-14-3 12

C.

may move

Defendants

t0

Withdraw a guilty plea prior

But the presentence Withdrawal 0f a guilty plea

is

A

not an automatic right.

m

Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535,

211 P.3d

at 780.

The defendant bears

the burden of proving, in district court, that the

plea should be Withdrawn. Li; Grifﬁth V. State, 121 Idaho 371, 374-75, 825 P.2d 94, 97-

98

(Ct.

App. 1992).
In ruling

as

0n a motion

a threshold matter,

voluntarily.

to

Withdraw a guilty

plea, the district court

must determine,

Whether the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently and

Mauro, 121 Idaho

at 180,

824 P.2d

at

111 (1991); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at

536, 211 P.3d at 781; State V. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Ct.

App. 1990).

If the plea

was

must determine whether

constitutionally valid, then the court

other reasons exist to allow the defendant t0 withdraw the plea. Mauro, 121 Idaho at 180,

824 P.2d

at 111.

When

such a motion

is

made

prior t0 sentencing the defendant

reason for withdrawing the plea. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho

good
to

faith, credibility,

withdraw

at

must present a just

535, 211 P.3d at 780. “[T]he

and weight of the defendant’s assertions

his plea are matters for the trial court to decide.”

in support

Li

at

of his motion

537, 211 P.3d at 782.

Moreover, where the defendant moves to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing but

19

after

he has read his presentence report or received other information about his probable

sentence, the court

is

to exercise

broad discretion, but

weighing the defendant’s apparent motive. State

may temper

its

liberality

by

145 Idaho 219, 222, 177 P.3d

V. Arthur,

966, 969 (2008). Ultimately, the decision t0 grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea lies in the discretion 0f the district court. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at

780.

The
his

district

examined

0f Dauber’s purported “just reasons” for Withdrawing

including his primary contention that the plea

plea,

(10/27/16 T11, p.30, L.1

adopts

all

all

—

p.38, L.16.)

It

correctly rejected those claims

of its reasoning for doing so 0n appeal. (10/27/16

On

appeal,

Dauber appears

t0

was unlawfully coerced.

Tr., p.30, L.1

Dauber again

— p.38,

state

L.16.)

have abandoned7 the myriad reasons for withdrawal

he raised in his afﬁdavit and exhibits below, save for the two grounds he
explicitly raise: 1)

and the

cites the state’s

now

appears t0

agreement not t0 prosecute his eX-Wife as

a “lie

made up by the

7

preserve arguments 0n appeal parties must raise issues in their opening briefs.

To

state,”

and an unlawful

“tactic

151 Idaho at 321, 256 P.3d at 729.

Patterson,

additional claims that the district court abused

withdraw

its

his plea, the state adopts all the district

denial of Dauber’s motion to Withdraw his plea.
L.16.)
itself is

not

before

it

Even

Dauber has preserved any
discretion in denying his motion to
court’s correct conclusions from its

(E

if

10/27/16 TL, p.30, L.1

—

p.38,

conclusions that “an assertion 0f innocence in
a just reason to permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea,” and that here, “a

This includes the

factual basis

used to coerce a plea”; and 2) Dauber

district court’s

was admitted by Mr. Dauber and independently found” by

accepted his plea. (10/27/16

Tr., p.33, Ls.5-10.)

the district court

That factual basis,

set forth in

the preliminary hearing transcript (2/20/15 Tr.) and grand jury transcripts (PSI V01. IV,

pp.29-91), clearly supported the district court’s ﬁnding and Dauber’s agreement that he

was “satisﬁed

that if evidence

of that character was presented to a jury in

this case

and the

jury found that evidence was credible, there would be a sufﬁcient basis in that evidence
for the jury t0 conclude unanimously that [he was] guilty of second degree murder” in

both cases (6/14/16

Tr., p.15,

L.17 — p.16, L.2).

20

argues that the district court wrongly assessed Dauber’s motive for seeking t0 Withdraw
his plea. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.)

As

for Dauber’s ﬁrst claim

it

fails for the

reasons already discussed above.

The

agreement not t0 prosecute Dauber’s eX-Wife was not coercive in a constitutional sense,

and for those same reasons,

it

did not “rise[] to the level ofjust reason” to withdraw the

plea. (10/27/16 Tr., p.36, Ls.12-14.)

Second, regarding the court’s conclusions about Dauber’s motives, the court
correctly identiﬁed that because

could “temper

its

motion. (10/27/16

liberality

Dauber “knew what the sentence would be” the court

by weighing

the defendant’s apparent motive” in ﬁling the

Tr., p.31, Ls.3-14.)

“[T]he good

faith, credibility,

and weight of the defendant’s assertions

0f his motion to Withdraw his plea are matters for the
147 Idaho

at

537, 211 P.3d at 782.

And here,

trial

court t0 decide.” Hanslovan,

the district court correctly assessed that the

delay between the plea and the motion to withdraw “suggest[ed] that there

this that is

it

may be

simply Mr. Dauber’s realization that the day 0f reckoning
a

much more

in support

sobering thought than he had thought

is

an aspect of

is

coming soon, and

When he

entered his guilty

plea.” (10/27/16 Tr., p.38, Ls.1-9.)

On appeal Dauber fails t0 show
best,” because, as

he apparently sees

error.

it,

He

maligns the court’s logic as “reaching

at

concerns about improper motivation would only

apply where a defendant “learn[s] of something” in the PSI or elsewhere “that would
cause the court t0 give a harsher sentence.” (Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
This

fails to

address the point.

The lengthy delay between

the plea and the

sentencing suggested that the motivation for the motion was not coercion (which, one

21

imagines, would have been brought t0 the district court’s attention soon after such a plea

had been unlawfully

extracted).

Instead, the

months—long delay, culminating in the ﬁling

0f a motion t0 Withdraw some 11 days before the sentencing hearing

(ﬂ R. V01.

tended to imply that Dauber had simply developed a case 0f buyer’s remorse.
the district court

liberality, its

was

entitled to assess

to

show

the district court abused

Tr., p.37,

its

p.78),

Because

Dauber’s all-too-apparent motive with tempered

common-sense conclusion Dauber was motivated by

reckoning” was proper. (10/27/16

II,

his

looming “day of

L.25 — p.38, L.9.) Dauber accordingly

discretion

when

fails

denied his motion t0 withdraw his

it

plea in light of his motivations.

D.

Of The Court’s Decision On The Motion T0 Withdraw The Plea,
Dauber Fails To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In Case CR-14-2027 Because
Irrespective

Dauber Never Filed A Motion T0 Withdraw His Plea In That Case

The
Withdraw

district court

his plea in case

speciﬁcally pointed out that

CR-14-3 14, but With respect

it

was denying Dauber’s motion

t0 case

to

CR-14-2027, Dauber never

ﬁled such a motion:

But

I

don’t

ﬁnd

that that apparent

motive would be a sufﬁcient reason to

determine any of the things that have been proffered are just reasons t0
permit the Withdrawal of the guilty plea.
In any event,
discretion,

N0 such

and

I
I

have considered these matters and

deny the motion

motion was putforward

t0

Withdraw

in the

in the

I

have exercised

312

my

case.

2027 case.

(10/27/16 Tr., p.38, Ls.10-17 (emphasis added).)

And
withdraw

While Dauber sent a

his plea in case

not accept

it

letter t0 the district court

CR-14-2027

as a ﬁling because

it

(ﬂ R.

V01.

II,

purporting t0 be a motion t0

pp.205-06), the district court did

would not “receive motions unless
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they’re ﬁled

by

counsel” (10/27/16

Tr., p.2, Ls.21-23).

exhibit to the motion in case CR-14-31.

The

letter itself

(R. V01.

II,

was eventually attached

pp.205-06.)

But

it

as an

was never

itself

ﬁled in case CR-14-2027—n0r was any other motion t0 Withdraw a plea ever ﬁled in case

CR-14-2027.

(E R. V01.

Thus, even

Dauber never moved

show

10/27/16 TL, p.38, Ls.15-17.)

concludes the

if this court

Withdraw Dauber’s plea

to

III;

t0

that

would not

its

by denying

affect the plea in case

Withdraw his plea

the district court abused

district court erred

in case

the motion to

CR-14-2027.

Because

CR-14-2027, Dauber necessarily

fails

discretion With respect to that case.

III.

Dauber Has Failed T0 State A Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel; And Even
Assuming He Has Sufﬁcientlv Articulated Such A Claim It Is Not Properly Before This
Court On Direct Appeal
Parties

must “identify

legal

issues

and provide authorities

arguments in the opening brief” to be considered by

supporting

this Court, Patterson, 151

the

Idaho

at

321, 256 P.3d at 729; see also State V. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970

(1996) (holding that a party waives an issue 0n appeal if argument or authority

lacking).

by an

Pro se

litigants “are

attorney.”

Twin

is

held to the same standards and rules as those represented

Falls Ctv. V. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445,

80 P.3d 1043, 1046

(2003).

Dauber has
simply
3rd

states that

failed to state a Viable claim

of ineffective assistance 0f counsel.

“counsel was ineffective” because they “failed to

party threat against” his eX-wife.

exactly counsel should have done,

why it prejudiced him.

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

Why

(E Appellant’s

their purported failure

brief, p.9.)
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He

litigate the falsiﬁed

But he does not say What

was deﬁcient, or how or

Nor does Dauber’s

lone, unexplained citation to

U.S. 365 (1986), shed any light on this claim. In

Kimmelman

Kimmelman,

trial

V.

Morrison, 477

counsel failed to ﬁle a

suppression motion in time, “not due t0 strategic considerations,” but because he was

unaware there was a

search.

Trial counsel

Li. at 385.

was unaware 0f

the search

“because he had conducted no pretrial discovery”; moreover, he failed to conduct
discovery not because he forgot t0 do so, but because he “belie[ved] that the State was
obliged to take the initiative and turn over

and
after

that the Victim’s preferences

all

0f

its

inculpatory evidence to the defense

would determine whether

an indictment had been returned.”

the State proceeded t0 trial

Li.

There, counsel’s performance—Which amounted t0 a “total failure t0 conduct pre-

trial

discovery, and one as to

which counsel offered only implausible explanations”—was

obviously deﬁcient performance.

Dauber has not explained What
deﬁcient for them not to do

brief, p.9.)

“litigation”

so, or

Kimmelman

is

inapplicable here because

he expected counsel t0 pursue,

what difference

it

would have made.

it

was

(E Appellant’s

is

if

Dauber has assembled a prima

facie claim

unable to press that claim 0n direct appeal.

0f ineffective assistance 0f

“By attempting

claim 0n direct appeal Without ﬁrst properly presenting the issue to the

Dauber has

Why

Thus, Dauber has failed t0 state a claim 0f ineffective assistance of counsel.

And even
counsel he

Li. at 386.

“failed t0

make

t0 bring this

district court,”

a necessary evidentiary record and deprived the State of any

opportunity to develop an evidentiary record on this issue.”
327, 329, 900 P.2d 803, 805 (Ct. App. 1995).

This

is

State V.

precisely

Gomez, 127 Idaho

Why

Idaho’s appellate

courts “have frequently declined to consider claims of ineffective assistance 0f counsel

direct appeal.”

Li

at

329-30, 900 P.2d at 805-06.
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“Because of

0n

[the] inability t0 resolve

such claims on the record 0f the criminal proceedings,” Idaho’s appellate courts have
instead “suggested that such claims be pursued

ﬂ

Li;

by

application for post-conviction relief.”

859 P.2d 972, 974

also State V. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376,

State V. Marks, 119 Idaho 64, 66, 803 P.2d 565,

567

(Ct.

App. 1991); State

Idaho 793, 795, 800 P.2d 680, 682 (Ct. App. 1990); State

800 P.2d 138, 141
928

(Ct.

(Ct.

App. 1990); State

V.

V.

App. 1993);

V. Steele,

118

Munoz, 118 Idaho 742, 745,

Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 523, 708 P.2d 921,

App. 1985).

In light of the applicable standards

assistance 0f counsel.

on

(Ct.

direct appeal in

Dauber

failed to state a claim

Moreover, because such a claim

any event,

this

is

0f ineffective

not properly before this Court

claim should likewise be dismissed.

CONCLUSION
The
afﬁrm the

state respectfully requests this

district

court’s

Court afﬁrm the judgments of conviction and

order denying Dauber’s

motion

t0

Withdraw his

Alternatively, should this Court conclude the district court erred in

constitutionality of the pleas, the state respectfully requests this Court

for the limited purpose

of determining probable cause.

DATED this 23rd day 0f April, 2019.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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